
































1. History of EU-Turkey Relations1 
1.1. Quid pro quo – the history behind Latvia’s support for Turkey 
HistoƌiĐallǇ, Latǀia has ďeeŶ suppoƌtiǀe of TuƌkeǇ’s iŶtegƌatioŶ iŶ the EU. The diploŵatiĐ 
relations between the two countries date back to 1925 and, importantly, Turkey was one of the 
countries that never acknowledged the annexation and subsequent incorporation of Latvia into 
the “oǀiet UŶioŶ. TuƌkeǇ ǁas also a stauŶĐh suppoƌteƌ of Latǀia’s NATO ŵeŵďeƌship. This 
eǆplaiŶs the LatǀiaŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt’s positiǀe staŶĐe toǁaƌds TuƌkeǇ’s EU aspiƌatioŶs, aŶd the 
friendly dialogue between the two governments. To an extent, this can be defined as a mutual 
quid pro quo poliĐǇ, aŶd is illustƌated ďǇ the LatǀiaŶ FoƌeigŶ MiŶisteƌ’s Edgaƌs RiŶkeǀiĐs’ 
statements during the meeting with the Turkish government representatives in Ankara on 29 
“epteŵďeƌ ϮϬϭ6, ǁheŶ he oŶĐe agaiŶ stƌessed that ͞Latǀia highlǇ ǀaluates the faĐt that TuƌkeǇ 
Ŷeǀeƌ ƌeĐogŶized its oĐĐupatioŶ.͟ 
Latǀia’s offiĐial/tƌaditioŶal positioŶ has ƌeŵaiŶed uŶĐhaŶged: TuƌkeǇ is still peƌĐeiǀed as aŶ EU 
candidate state, although it has problems with opening new chapters in accession negotiations. 
The Latvian political elite sees this as a problematic issue in the Turkey-EU relations, but there 
are no major repercussions for the Turkey-Latvia relations. During the Latvian FoƌeigŶ MiŶisteƌ’s 
visit to Ankara in autumn 2016, both sides discussed not only cooperation within NATO, bilateral 
economic and political relations, but also relations between Turkey and the EU, and the 
attempted coup of 15 July 2016. The Latvian Foreign Minister condemned the attempt to 
overthrow Recep Tayyip EƌdoğaŶ’s ƌegiŵe aŶd eǆpƌessed ĐoŶdoleŶĐes to the ǀiĐtiŵs of the 
terrorist attacks in Turkey, while implying that it is crucial to respect the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of people. The minister also ƌeaffiƌŵed Latǀia’s suppoƌt foƌ TuƌkeǇ’s fuƌtheƌ EuƌopeaŶ 
iŶtegƌatioŶ aŶd opeŶiŶg of Ŷeǁ Đhapteƌs of ŶegotiatioŶs as loŶg as the EU’s Đƌiteƌia aƌe ŵet. 
Crucially, the Latvian government believes that from a long-term perspective, in spite of the 
conseƋueŶĐes of Bƌeǆit aŶd the U“ PƌesideŶtial eleĐtioŶ, TuƌkeǇ’s ŵeŵďeƌship is also iŶ the 
interests of the EU.  
Despite the EƌdoğaŶ pƌesideŶĐǇ’s loǁ deŵoĐƌatiĐ ƌeĐoƌds aŶd authoƌitaƌiaŶ leaŶiŶgs, theƌe haǀe 
been no considerable changes in the Latvian positon toǁaƌds TuƌkeǇ’s EU aŶd NATO 
membership. The official belief is that also in the future the EU and NATO will continue to 
cooperate with Turkey, perhaps tactically adjusting their approach, because Turkey is too 
important geopolitically, economically, and strategically, and also has a strong military capacity. 
TuƌkeǇ’s EU ŵeŵďeƌship does Ŷot hold a pƌoŵiŶeŶt plaĐe iŶ Latǀia’s politiĐal deďate, i.e. aŵoŶg 
the government parties and the opposition. The opposition is largely unconcerned with the 
issue. To some eǆteŶt, this ĐaŶ ďe attƌiďuted to the laĐk of suďstaŶtial pƌogƌess iŶ TuƌkeǇ’s EU 
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 The EU 28 Country Reports were completed before the Turkish Constitutional Referendum on 16 April 2017. 
Thus, the report does not take account of any potential changes in the national debate that might have 
occurred in the meantime. 
  
 








negotiations and the geographical distance between the two countries. But the preoccupation of 
Latvian society with other, more burning issues – such as its own integration in the EU, security 
issues, Ukraine crisis etc. – is probably the main factor setting the tone of the debate. This also 
explains why Latvia has been a frontrunner regarding the Eastern Partnership countries, but has 
Ŷeǀeƌ ďeeŶ oǀeƌlǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith the EU’s Southern neighborhood. 
With regard to the Latvian public, the situation to a certain extent reflects the political debate. 
The ŵajoƌitǇ of people haǀe a Ŷeutƌal attitude toǁaƌds TuƌkeǇ, Tuƌkish people aŶd TuƌkeǇ’s 
membership in the EU, at least such was the stance until the refugee crisis in 2015 and the 
attempted coup in 2016. There are no statistics on how these attitudes have changed since then, 
but mass media generally talk about Turkey in the terms of these issues. This is likely to reflect 
on general opiŶioŶ, ďut is uŶlikelǇ to affeĐt Latǀia’s offiĐial staŶĐe toǁaƌds TukeǇ’s EU iŶtegƌatioŶ 
considerably.  
1.2. Change of narrative 
There is a distinction between narratives of the elites/government and of the public opinion. 
Regarding the position of the elite, it is an interest-based approach focusing on Turkey as an 
economic, geostrategic partner and – relating to the identity and culture dimension – to an 
extent as a cultural bridge between West and the Middle East. 2016 was a tipping point 
however, since the interest-based narrative about Turkey joining the EU in the same way as 
other candidate states have done has irreversibly ended. The populist and anti-immigration 
seŶtiŵeŶts ďehiŶd Bƌeǆit aŶd DoŶald Tƌuŵp’s eleĐtioŶ ƌefleĐt the gƌoǁiŶg ŶatioŶalisŵ aŶd 
intolerance in Europe and globally. The identity policies and Islamophobia will take (and have 
already taken) a more prominent role also in the Latvian official narrative, just like they have on 
a global scale. Statements by imprudent EU and US politicians incite anti-Islam ideas, ignoring 
the fact that the Muslim world like the Western world is highly heterogeneous.  
Therefore, it is also very probable that the public narrative regarding Turkey will change in the 
Ŷeaƌ futuƌe. UŶtil ϮϬϭ6, the LatǀiaŶ soĐietǇ aĐĐepted the elite’s positioŶ ƌegaƌdiŶg the EU aŶd 
NATO enlargement without much reservation, but 2016 has brought around new trends that will 
likely lead to radicalization of opinions and worsening of the attitude towards Turkey. This 
growing public leaning towards defining Turkey under terms of the ͞otherness͟ narrative, 
although not an entirely new phenomenon, is something that the political elite should keep in 
mind. 
1.3. Refugee crisis and economics 
The Latvian government traditionally considers Turkey to be an important economic partner 
outside the EU in such sectors as pharmaceuticals, food industry, timber industry, transport, 
logistics and tourism. However, as stated above, Latvia is highly integrated within the EU and is 
not dependent on trade with Turkey, despite the growing trade between the two. 
  
 








Currently the most crucial policy area discussed regarding the EU-Turkey relations is political 
cooperation and the refugee issue, the solution of which is currently considered a number one 
priority for the EU. This coincides with the above-mentioned changes in narratives. The society is 
demanding loyalty from Turkey in exchange for its EU integration. However, if Turkey fails to 
contain the refugee flow to the EU, and the EU is not ready to respond to a new flow of 
refugees, the relations with Turkey and the narrative will change.  
2. Future of EU-Turkey Relations 
2.1. The main concerns regarding the EU-Turkey relations 
The differences in political and ideological orientations of Turkey and the EU have always been 
present, but due to the prevailing narrative until 2016, they were not outspoken. The current 
discussions in the Turkish Parliament and EƌdoğaŶ’s aŶŶouŶĐeŵeŶts ƌegaƌdiŶg TuƌkeǇ’s iŶteƌest 
in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, attempts to introduce a presidential system in 
Turkey, as well as human rights breaches will likely lead the Latvian government (and the EU) to 
express their concerns. This is not to say that the concerns about political and ideological 
situatioŶ iŶ TuƌkeǇ aƌe Ŷeǁ, ďut the Tuƌkish goǀeƌŶŵeŶt’s oǁŶ aĐtioŶs aƌe likelǇ to legitiŵize 
public condemnation of these actions, and for that Turkey should also blame itself, not just the 
growing Islamophobia. 
As stated aďoǀe, the LatǀiaŶ soĐietǇ ǁas Ŷot too ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith TuƌkeǇ’s ŵeŵďeƌship iŶ the EU 
until 2015/16, and the issue generally was excluded from the national agenda. Hence the 
geŶeƌal opiŶioŶ ǁas laƌgelǇ iŶ ĐoŵpliaŶĐe ǁith the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt’s positioŶ or alternatively rather 
neutral towards the Tuƌkish people aŶd TuƌkeǇ’s ŵeŵďeƌship. The LatǀiaŶ soĐietǇ has alǁaǇs 
had some concerns with Islam and its perceived incongruity with democratic and Christian 
values. However, the current authoritarian trends in Turkey, as well as the increasingly 
widespread Islamophobia seem to have taken these arguments from the level of mere populist 
statements to the general feeling in the society. Therefore, despite the unchanged Latvian 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt aŶd elite positioŶ, people’s staŶĐe toǁaƌds TuƌkeǇ’s poteŶtial ŵeŵďeƌship is 
increasingly negative. 
2.2. Dangers of a differentiated integration 
Theƌe haǀe ďeeŶ Ŷo disĐussioŶs iŶ Latǀia oŶ ĐhaŶgiŶg the EU’s appƌoaĐh to TuƌkeǇ Ǉet, aŶd due 
to the prevailing shock from the 2016 events, an alternative model has not yet been developed 
or discussed. The only alternative at the moment is the scenario that was already set out by 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel. It envisaged introducing a privileged partnership in case the 
situation in Turkey deteriorates. However, there are also concerns from the Latvian perspective 
on whether such an approach would be successful and whether it would not push Turkey closer 
to Russia. Although rapprochment of Russia and Turkey is possible, from the historical 
  
 








perspective such ͞romance͟ between Russia and Turkey is not likely to be long lasting. Their 
relations are strongly affected by gas interests, and once the US shale gas lobby will gain its 
access to the European market, the ͞pipeline diplomacy͟ will have a much smaller impact. 
2.3. Concerns over the undemocratic developments in Turkey 
The undemocratic developments in Turkey are certainly the main issue influencing the current 
deďate iŶ Latǀia oŶ TuƌkeǇ’s EU ŵeŵďeƌship. Foƌ a loŶg peƌiod of tiŵe, ŵedia seldoŵ ƌepoƌted 
on Turkey, but the increasing amount of human right breaches, especially after the failed coup, 
and EƌdoğaŶ’s authoƌitaƌiaŶ aspiƌatioŶs Đƌeate aŶ iŶĐƌeasiŶg ĐoŶĐeƌŶ aďout TuƌkeǇ’s poteŶtial 
membership. Additionally, the extremely negative Latvian perception of refugees, which is 
further stirred up by media and more radical political forces, which use the religious factor as an 
argument against the potential refugee integration (and even their willingness and ability to 
integrate) in the Latvian society, has translated into considerable Islamophobia. This has grown 
into an openly discussed suspicion against any predominantly Muslim country. Turkey is no 
exception, and its ability to adjust to the EU ͞values͟ is considered unlikely by the majority of the 
general public.  
3. EU-Turkey Relations and the Neighbourhood/Global scene 
3.1. The Russian factor in Latvian foreign policy 
Latvia is aware that Turkey was expecting more support from the EU concerning a privileged 
status, speeding up the accession talks and many other issues. But, understanding its own weak 
position, EƌdoğaŶ’s ƌegiŵe oppoƌtuŶistiĐallǇ sought Đloseƌ ƌelatioŶs ǁith Russia. Fƌoŵ the 
Latvian perspective, this rapprochement is considered dangerous, as Latvian relations with 
Russia are deeply suspicious at best of times.  
This is especially important in relation to the Syria crisis and other conflicts in the Middle East. As 
NATO member, Turkey is seen as the main ally of Latvia and the EU in settling the crisis in Syria, 
the constant lack of clarity on TurkeǇ’s staŶĐe toǁaƌds Russia is ĐausiŶg uŶease iŶ LatǀiaŶ 
political elite and society. To an extent, the low point in Turkey-Russia relations after the 
shooting down of the Russian jet in late 2015 by the Turkish military was seen in a bizarrely 
positive light by the general public in the sense of the perspective of ͞the eŶeŵǇ’s eŶeŵǇ is ŵǇ 
friend͟. Overall, however Latvia has always been much more concerned with the Eastern 
Partnership, and certainly the settlement of the conflict in Ukraine is one of its foreign policy 
priorities. However, it would be an overstatement to say that it has left a considerable impact on 
the disĐussioŶ aďout TuƌkeǇ’s EU ŵeŵďeƌship. 
  
 








3.2. Geopolitics matter 
Tukey is geopolitically extremely important as a partner of Latvia and the EU. Turkey is crucial 
due to its comparatively good relations with Israel and the potential role in settling the conflicts 
in Syria and Iraq, as well as relations with Iran. Turkey has both the historical experience and the 
military expertise and playing it smart it could continue to develop as a geopolitical partner of 
the EU and Latvia. It is hard to say whether this cooperation will also develop on a bilateral level 
between Latvia and Turkey, but both countries already cooperate successfully within the NATO 
structures. 
On the other hand, if the EU wants to work with Turkey instead of pushing it away, it is crucial to 
give it a clear message that the EU itself is also inteƌested iŶ TuƌkeǇ’s geopolitiĐal seĐuƌitǇ. 
Ahmet Daǀutoğlu, as the father of the current Turkish foreign policy has failed with his ideas of 
aǀoidiŶg ĐoŶfliĐts ǁith Ŷeighďouƌs. IŶstead, the last Ǉeaƌs’ Tuƌkish foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ Đould Ŷot hiŶdeƌ 
negative developments – conflicts in Iraq and Syria escalated, tensions in relations with Greece, 
and even with Russia emerged. Because of these tensions Turkey is also interested in 
cooperation with the EU, while EƌdoğaŶ’s oǁŶ staŶĐe seeŵs to ďe the ďiggest eŶigŵa that might 
affect the whole project.  
3.3. Refugees and populism 
The ƌefugee Đƌisis, the Bƌeǆit ǀote iŶ UK, as ǁell as DoŶald Tƌuŵp’s eleĐtioŶ as the U“ pƌesideŶt 
mark the end of the post-Cold War order. In the words of one of the Latvian parliamentarians, 
͞ϮϬϭ6 ǁill ďe ƌeŵeŵďeƌed as the Ǉeaƌ ǁheŶ the peƌiod of peaĐe aŶd liďeƌal ideas eŶded.͟ The 
growing populism and Islamophobia like elsewhere in the world has left its imprint on Latvian 
society. Although the narrative of Turkish otherness to the ͞Europeans͟ and their values is not 
new to Latvians, the current state of the world is likely to only severe the generally negative 
attitude toǁaƌds TuƌkeǇ’s pƌospeĐtiǀe iŶtegƌatioŶ ǁith the EU. 
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